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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first probabilistic projections of the world population. These 
projections were carried out as part of the updated 1996 revision (forthcoming in May-June 1996) of 
The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? (W. Lutz, ed., 1994). Projections 
are performed at the level of 13 regions to the year 2100. The approach is based on expert judgement 
about the trend and uncertainty of future fertility, mortality and migration in all the regions. For each 
of the components a group of experts defined three alternative future paths: low, central, and high. A 
standard normal distribution is fitted to these assumptions with the central assumption giving the most 
likely case (mean), and the low and high assumptions giving the range of 90% of all possible cases. 
Drawing randomly from these distributions, 4000 simulations produced uncertainty distributions for 
future population size and age structure. The simulations presented consider both the cases of 
independenceldependance between regions (whether regions follow the same above or below average 
trend) and between fertility and mortality trends. 
One of the many results is that we are able to say now that there is roughly a two-thirds 
probability that the world population will not double any more in the future. The 95 percent 
confidence intervals for total world population in 2020 are 7.5-8.3 billion (median: 7.9); in 2050, 8.1- 
12.0 billion (median: 10.0); and in 2100, 5.7-17.3 billion (median: 10.7). 
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1 Introduction 
One thing that  we know with certainty about the future population sizes is that they are 
uncertain. The nature of this uncertainty and how to deal with it are highly controversial 
and still scientifically unresolved issues. Is there a well-defined sense in which there exists 
a distribution of possible future populations? Can mean, median, and modal future 
population sizes be determined? Can confidence intervals for future population sizes be 
derived? The literature on projections contains three views on this, none of which we 
find wholly satisfactory. In this paper, we provide a fourth prospective. 
Most national and international agencies that produce population projections avoid 
addressing the issue of uncertainty explicitly. Typically they provide one main variant 
that  is to be considered the most likely case. Sometimes high, low, and other variants 
are added, but these are virtually never given a probabilistic interpretation. If anything 
is said explicitly, it is that  the high and low variants should not be considered to  define 
coilfidence intervals. Supplementing the variants with presentations of extreme case 
scenarios can be useful for sensitivity analysis, but it does not help in quantifying the 
extent of uncertainty. 
In contrast, a number of methods of producing fully probabilistic populatjon projec- 
tioils have been proposed and implemented, although so far only on the national level..[:l] 
These approaches, which are almost exclusively based on time series models, produce 
distributions of future populations sizes, and thus, seem to be able to tell us, quite 
precisely, how much uncertainty there is in the outcomes of population projections. A 
third possibility is to make an assessment of the likely error in future projections, by 
evaluating the errors made in past projections. This approach has been suggested in 
Iieyfitz (1981), and Stoto (1983). Depending on one's perspective, it llas the advantage 
or disadvanta.ge of using past data  on projectjon accuracy. 
I11 this paper, we propose and implement a new method for dealing with tlle un- 
certainty of future population sizes. We call our projectioils "proba.bilistic population 
projections based on expert opinion." It is distinguished from tlle other methods by its 
use of expert opinion on both the future courses of fertility, mortality, aad migration, 
a.nd on the extent of their uncertainty. To our knowledge this is the first time t11a.t 
probabilistic population projections have been made in this manner, and the first time 
tlla,t a probabilistic model has been applied to all world regions. Therefore, our results 
should he treated with the  same sort of ca.ution that is appropriate for all new ideas 
before they are thoroughly tested. Nevertheless, we think that the use of expert opinioil 
could have significant advantages over the use of time series models or past projection 
performa.nce. 
In Section 2 of this paper, we briefly discuss the illotivation for developing a new 
a,pproa,ch to  probabilistic population projections. Sectioil 3 discusses the interpretation 
of confidence intervals in the present contest. Section 4 contains a description of how 
me took the opinions of the experts and combined them to produce our probabilistic 
population projections. In Section 5, we present the information we have obtained on 
population size and age structure for each of thirteen regions, which together cover the 
entire globe. In Section 6,  we present similar data for the world as a whole. We conclude 
in Section 7, with a discussioil of the implications of the expert-based probabilistic 
projections for the interpretation of other projections. 
2 The Motivation for New Probabilistic 
Population Projections 
The usefulness of a population projection is enllanced by knowing its range of uncertainty. 
Indeed, the uncertainty as well as the mean of a projection could influence the actions 
that  policy-makers talte. There currently exist two methods of quantitatively assessing 
the likely error of a. projection: (1) time series analysis, and (2) e s  post error analysis. 
In time series analysis, parameters are estimated from past data on the deter~nina~l ts  of 
population change, like fertility and mortality. Those parameters, along with estimates 
of their uncertainty are used to  project the information needed for population projections 
into the future. In e s  post error analysis, data is collected on the extent of errors in 
past projections. On the assumption that  those errors are what ca,n be espected in the 
future, we ca,n tell policy-makers and others what range of errors to  expect. 
Time series analysis is an approach, not a recipe. Different people using time series 
a,nalysis on the sa.me data have produced different projections along with different er- 
ror estimates.[2] Most of the assumptions in the time series approach are statistical in 
nature. Thus, in evaluating a set of different time series based projections, we need to  
discuss statistical concepts such as stationarity, linearity, transformations of va.ria.bles, 
orders of autoregressive and moving-average processes, autocorrelation, error term corre- 
1a.tions equations and a whole host of others that  have no easy tra,nslation into tlle birth 
rates, death rates, and migration rates that  we need to make a popula,tion projection. 
It is ea.sy to  use a set of sta.tistica1 assunlptions, that  althougl~ they individually seein 
plausible, produce i~llplications for future demographic changes that  would be thought 
to be llighly unlikely by esperts in the field. The probleln might not be with aay par- 
ticular a.ssumption, but with a complex interactioll of assumptions that  is difficult to  
diagnose. In addition, tlle information that the time series analysis takes out of a his- 
torical dataset is typically short-run in nature. Most commonly, demograpllic variables 
a.re only related to  their own values over the previous few yea.rs. This is fine for nlakillg 
relatively short-run projections. In making long-run projections it is inore appropriate 
to use a procedure that  focuses on the determinants of longer term changes. Because of 
the indirect connection between a,ssumptions a.nd implications, it is difficult for policy- 
ma1;ers and others not trained in statistics to  assess the error bounds produced by time 
series a.nalysis. 
Ex p . s t  error analysis is much clearer tllan time series analysis, but it also has a 
problenl when used in tlle context of multiple projections of the sa,me population over 
tlle same period. Suppose one projection said that the popula.tion a t  some future date 
~vould be 10 inillion people and another said it would be 20 million people. If the mean 
error of past projections was plus or minus 15 percent, we would have to  tell policy- 
makers that  the population would be 10 million plus or minus 15 percent or 20 million 
plus or nliilus 15 percent. Thus it is possible that the average of past errors is snlall 
compared t o  the variation in the projections. In such cases, the policy-maker might just 
ignore the average past errors and use the range of population projections as an indicator 
of uncertainty. Also the applica.tion of ex post errors to the future involves the strong 
a.ssumptions that  forecasters today make the sanle mista.kes and nliss simila,r kinds of 
structural discontinuities as did the foreca.sters of the past. 
All population projections are based on judgment. We feel t11a.t the best way to  
produce projections is to  make tlle judgment very explicit base them on the syllthesized 
opinioll of a group of experts.[3] In the case of probabilistic projections, we obtain 
inforination from the experts not only on fertility, mortality, and migration trends, but 
on how uilcertaiil those trends a,re. This information is provided in a form that is clear 
a.nd easy to assess. By bringing together information from a va,riety of experts who a.re 
specialists is different fields, we believe t l n t  we ca.n capture tlle best iilforinatio~l that 
the world currently has to offer. 
3 The Concept of Confidence Intervals for 
Population Projections 
Tlle future is not only uncerta.in, but we are not even close to understanding tlle processes 
rvllich describe its unfolding. In inaking a projection, we inust a.bstract froin most 
eleinents of an extremely complex reality and focus on oilly a few of them. There are 
an infinite iluillber of ways of inaking these abstractions, and it is na.tura1 that  different 
projections would embody different assumptions. At any future da.te, differences in 
a.ssumptions imply, in general, different distributions of population sizes, in pa.rticular, 
different mean populations and different 9.5 percent confidence intervals. 
Table 1 contaiils data  on various projections of the population of tlle United States 
a.round 2065 made around 1990. The figures in tlle table are a.da,pted froin Lee and 
Tulja.purliar (1994) and are ordered according to the lower bound of the 9.5 percent 
confidence interval. The first coluinn identifies tlle projection. The second column 
sllorvs t,he nleaa population size and the third a,nd fourth coluillils show the lower and 
upper bouild respectively of the 95 percent confidence interval. I11 the ta.ble, the inea,n 
population of the US a.round 206.5 ranges from 296 inillion to 680 nlillion people. The 
lon-er l~ound of t,he 9.5 percent confidence interva.1 goes from 207 nlillion to  .552 illillion 
people. The upper bound ranges between 349 and 836 million. 
The incoilsistencies in this table a.re clear. According to  a time series estiina,te made 
in Pfla.umer (1992), using tlle logarithm of population as the va,riable to be expla.ined, 
we a.re 95 percent confident tl1a.t the US populatioil a.round '206.5 would lie l~etrveen .551 
aad 836 million people. According to  the US Census Bureau (1989), we are 9.5 percent 
confident that  tlle US population at  that time would lie between 207 a,nd 4.56 niillioil 
people. Clea.rly, 110th caililot be correct. For example, we cannot simulta.neouslq. believe 
tl1a.t tlle probability of the popula.tion being 551 million or less is 2.5 percent and tlle 
prol~a.bility of the population I~eing 456 million or less is 97.5 percent. 
Tllere a.re nine projections given in Tuble 1 and they ad1 produce contradictory 
confidence intervals. How should we interpret this? First of all, it is vital to  rea,lize that 
there is no particular "correct" 9.5 percent confidence interval in that table. Given that 
the reality t,llat we are trying to forecast is so dista,nt from our current ui~derstai~ding of 
it,, it is to  be expected that different projections would ernbody different a,ssumptions and 
produce different confidence intervals. This nleans that it is never appropriate to say t11a.t 
the future population will certainly lie within a particular 95 percent confideilce interval. 
Tllese coilfidence intervals are dependent on the assumptions illa,de in the projections 
a.nd, as can be seen froin Table 1, c.a.11 vary drainatically from projection to  projection. 
Second, the problem of multiple iilcoilsistent confidence intervals is not just a prob- 
lein with the projections in Table 1. It is a generic phenoinenon that a.fflicts a.11 proba.- 
l~ilistic popula,tion projections rega,rdless of the nlethodology used. Time series a,na.lysis 
a,nd the projections based on expert opillion presented here bot,h produce differeilt con- 
fitlence interva.ls, whenever their underlying assuinptions change. 
Thus, it is just as impossible to  tell policy-makers and others what tlle future con- 
fidence interval for a population would be, as it is to tell tl~eill exactly ~vllat tlle future 
populatioil size would be. We can produce projectioils of population distributioils wit11 
associated means, medians, and coilfidence intervals, but all those statistics depend on 
the assuinptions that  are used. The procedure that we use here makes those assumptions 
crystal clear, but there is no procedure that frees us from our assunlptions and provides 
us with the unique and true future population distributions. We call tell policy-nlaliers 
and others what future population means and confidence will be, given the set of as- 
sulnptions that  we use. Our assumptioils are our best assessineilt that  we call inalie 
about future trends and their uncertainties. Tomorrow, however, we nlay be able to 
lllalie even better assessments. This will result in different projected mean population 
sizes and different confidence intervals. 
4 The Methodology 
I11 short, the approach chosen here to  produce probabilistic population projections is 
based on three uncertainty distributions (for fertility, mortality, and ~nigration) assumed 
for each world region. These are standard norinal distributions fitted to the low, central, 
and high values by the experts under the assuinptioll that  the range betueen the low 
and lligll values covers 90 percent of all cases, i.e., oilly .5 percent if all possible cases 
are assnmed to lie above the high value and ailother 5 percent l ~ e l o ~ v  the low talue. By 
ralldonlly drawing fro111 these distributions for each region a total of 4,000 sinlulatioil runs 
(with tlle inultistate population projection inodel DIALOG) resulted in the distiibutiolls 
of future population size and age structure that  will be discussed below. 
4.1 Fertility 
Our fertility assumptiolls are b a e d  on the da.ta in A p p e n d i x  TuGIe 1. dpperz(li:c Table 1 
gives four ilunlbers for each region, the 1995 total fertility ra.te (TFR) ,  a.nd low? central, 
and lligll values for the interval 2030-2035, a.nd defines in inore deta.il tlle tllrce paths 
froin 1995 to  2100. Clea.rly, there a.re a large number of wa.ys to use these cla,ta to  generate 
ra,ndoln T F R  paths into the future. We have chosen a, particularly silnple procedure of 
randolll lines (or piece-wise linear paths, to be more precise) here.[4] A standard ilorillal 
clistributioil is used to  specify random lines that  conform to  the 90 percent confide~lce 
intervals in A p p e n d i x  Table 1. 
I11 our procedure, we only make use of one random draw froin tlle normal distribution 
to determiile tlle full fertility path froill 1995 to  2100. We do not literally believe that  all 
time paths of the total fertility rate will be ra,ndoln lines. An alterna.tive view would be 
t , l~at  he TFRs would behave lilie a bounded random walk. Each bounded random walk 
v.ould produce a population total (see Goldstein et  a / .  (1994) for a. lllodel of this sort) 
aad in the aggregate a distribution of populatio~ls fvould be genera.ted for each projectioil 
period. Tllese sort of bounded randonl walks produce distributioils of populatiorl sizes 
that  are coilce~ltrated around a central value, and ~vllicll a.re qualitatively identica.1 to  
those obt.ained using the assumptions described above. 
\,lie believe t11a.t the prime advantage of tlle combiilatioil of normality and 1inearit.y 
a.ssuinptions (random lines instead of random walks) is that  they provide a si~nple and 
rea.sona.bly robust way of genera.ting populatioil distributions. Their illa,iil disadvantage 
is that they are inappropriate to predict short-term popula.tion dynamics because of its 
grea.ter volatility. 
4.2 Mortality 
The procedure chosen to produce mortality paths that  are randomly chosen from a 
normal distribution is analogous to that described for fertility. Because the mortality 
scenarios had been defined in terms of improvements over 10 year periods, the low, 
central, and high values first need to be converted into values of life expectancy. This 
provides us with three points of the 2030-2035 distribution of life expectancies, which is 
the esa,ct analog of three points of the distribution of TFRs in 2030-2035 given 1)y the 
esperts. As in the case of fertility, random points are determined for the life espectancies 
in 2030-2035 and 2080-2085. Next, the time path of tlle life espectancy is linearly 
interpolated froill the 1995 to the randomly chosen 2030-2035 level, and aga.in from the 
2030-203.5 to 2080-2085. After 2080-2085, all life especta.ncies are a.ssuined to  renla.in 
constant. C4iven the chosen path of change in life espectancy at  l~ i r th ,  age-specific 
nlortality rates were derived using Brass' relational logit illode1 life tables. 
4.3 Migration 
Espert opinion guided the production of a table of interregional migration ilows, in 
terills of tlle annua.1 levels of net migra.tion, Appendix Ta.ble 4. Tllese floivs a.re a.ssumec1 
to  rema.in constant over time. The figures in Appencliz Tuble 2 represent t,he high values 
of those flows. The central value is a.ssumed to be half of the high value, aad the low valne 
is a.ssumed to l ~ e  zero for a.11 migration flows.[5] Agadn a standa.rd norillal distribution 
is assumed with the high and low values covering 90 percent of all cases. If a randoin 
migra,tion flow is less tllan zero, the migration flow t11a.t we use in the projection is 
a.ssumed to be zero. The a.ge-specific interregional migra.tion ra.tes are derived from 
age-specific schedules in Rogers and Castro (1981). 
4.4 Interrelationships between the  coillpoileilts 
Population projections typically do not assume that the trends in the three coillponents 
of populatioil change are related to one another. I11 this paper, we also consider migration 
to  be independent of tlle other two coinponents and of the age structure and size of 
the population, but we do consider the possibility of a correlation between fertility 
and mortality. In following sections, we provide population projections where fertility 
and nlortality are perfectly (positively) correlated and where fertility and inortality are 
uncorrela ted. 
4.5 Interrelationsl~ips between regions 
Most intenla.tiona1 population projections assume that in their high variants all countries 
and regions siinultaneously have higher than expected fertility aad vice versa in the 
low va,riant. Nevertheless, fertility and mortality might or might not follow pa,rallel 
trends across regions. The interdependencies between the two can be quite coinples. 
For esa.mple, fertility might be correlated a.cross the regions in which the ma.jority of 
inha.bitants are Muslim, but this fertility level might be uncorrelated wit11 trends in 
Europe and Latin America. 
I11 dealing with interrelations between regions, we again choose a simple strategy. 
\Ale consider the situations in ~vllich fertility and mortality are either perfectly correla.ted 
a.cross regions or uncorrelated. Fertility levels could be correlated across regions and so 
migllt inortality levels, but, within regions, fertility and mortality could still be eitller 
correla.ted or uncorrelated with one another. Similarly, fertility and mortality could be 
uncorrelated wit11 fertility and inortality respectively across regions, but correlated wit11 
one a,nother witllin each specific region. 
Both in the case of interrelationships between coillponents and interrelationships 
between regions, we are dealing with long-term dependencies. Tlle procedures that  we 
use link the entire time paths of fertility and mortality together within regions and across 
regions. 
5 Regional Results 
5.1 Regional populatioil sizes 
T ~ ~ b l e  8 shows the populations of each our thirteeil regions for 199.5. In acldit,ion, it 
sllows the mean and mediail projected populations in 2020, 2050, a,nd 2100, a.s well a.s 
the bounds of 95 percent confidence interval for each date. Tllese nuinbers were produced 
on the a.ssuinption that there was no long-run correlation between fertility a.nd inort,a.lity 
within regions. In Sectioil 5.3 below, we provide an esanlple of the impa.ct of that  such 
a. correla.tioi1 could have. 
There is so mucl~ information in this table t11a.t we have spa.ce here to point out 
only a few of the interesting findings. The table conta~iiins two indicators of asyminetric 
population size distributions: (1) the difference between the inean and median popula- 
tion, and ( 2 )  the difference between tlle average of lower a.nd upper bounds of the 9.5 
percent confideilce interval and tlle median. Roughly speaking, when the illean is greater 
t11a.n the inedia,n a,nd tlle difference between tlle a,vera.ge of the bounds a,nd the median 
is positive, then the distribution of population sizes is a.syinmetric ailcl has a. rela.tivelp 
long right ta.il (i.e., in the direction of higher population sizes). 
Consider first, the data for China and centrally planned Asia.. In 1995, the region 
had a, population of 1.36 billion people. Let us look a t  wha't 11a.ppens to lower bouild of 
the 95 percent confidence intervals. By 2020 according to our popula.tion distribution, 
there is a 2.5 percent chance that the population would be below 1.53 1)illion. Thirty 
yea,rs later, there is a 2.5 percent cl~a~nce that the popula.tion would be below 1.3.5 billion, 
a.nd by the end of the 21st century, there is a 2.5 percent chance that  the population 
would be below 0.71 billion. The table tells us that between 2050 and 2100, there is 
a cha,nce that  China's population would fall by a,lmost half. At the high end of the 
spectrum, the ta.ble tells us t11a.t China in 2100 has a 2.5 percent chance of ha,ving a 
population above 4.43 billion. The popula.tioi1 distribution for China, in 2100 is very 
sltewed, with relatively high probabilities of having relatively high populatioil sizes. The 
future distributions of population for China behave in this way because it is assunled that  
tlle lower end of their T F R  range is below replacement level, while the upper end is a.bove 
replacelllent. LVitll below repla.ceinent fertility, population size goes to zero and with 
a,bove replacement fertility, the population increases exponentially. The lower bound 
of the 95 percent confidence interval shows the possibility of the popula.tioi1 tlecliniilg 
towa.rd zero and the upper bound shows the possibility of exponential growth. 





















